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Since 1950, when Alan Turing proposed what has since come to be called
the Turing test, the ability of a machine to pass this test has established
itself as the primary hallmark of general AI. To pass the test, a machine
would have to be able to engage in dialogue in such a way that a human
interrogator could not distinguish its behaviour from that of a human be-
ing. AI researchers have attempted to build machines that could meet this
requirement, but they have so far failed. To pass the test, a machine would
have to meet two conditions: (i) react appropriately to the variance in human
dialogue and (ii) display a human-like personality and intentions. We argue,
first, that it is for mathematical reasons impossible to program a machine
which can master the enormously complex and constantly evolving pattern of
variance which human dialogues contain. And second, that we do not know
how to make machines that possess personality and intentions of the sort
we find in humans. Since a Turing machine cannot master human dialogue
behaviour, we conclude that a Turing machine also cannot possess what is
called “general” Artificial Intelligence. We do, however, acknowledge the po-
tential of Turing machines to master dialogue behaviour in highly restricted
contexts, where what is called “narrow” AI can still be of considerable utility.
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1 Introduction
Conversation is an activity that differentiates homo sapiens from all other species. It
is through conversation that we express our consciousness of reality and our ability to
think. Conversation is the foundation of human society and of human culture.
It is therefore no surprise that, when Alan Turing proposed what was later to be
called the “Turing Test” to determine whether machines can emulate the human ability
to think, he framed his test around the idea of a machine that was able to mimic a
human interlocutor in what he calls the “imitation game”. Specifically, a human is
assigned the role of interrogator and engages in separate dialogues with a computer and
a second human, who however remain anonymous. The interrogator then has the task of
discerning which of the two dialogue partners is a machine by asking a series of questions
to the other two participants, who are however not allowed to ask questions themselves
(Turing, 1950).1 The machine passes the test if it can “play the imitation game so well
that an average interrogator will not have more than 70 per cent chance of making the
right identification after five minutes of questioning.”2
Turing believed that by the end of the 20th century a “learning machine” (op. cit. §7)
could be built that would pass this test, and he assumes that building such a machine is
only a matter of memory size, computation speed and “proper programming”. To pass
the test a machine would need to display what is called Artificial General Intelligence
(also referred to as “general AI”), defined as the ability of a machine to emulate the
cognitive performance and general experiential understanding of its environments that
humans possess (Muehlhauser, 2013). The implementation of general AI has been a
major goal of research since the 1950s. Although its precise definition is disputed in the
literature, we agree with the AI research community that a machine that could conduct
a convincing dialogue with a human would possess general AI (and that a machine which
cannot conduct such a dialogue does not have general AI).
Many in the AI community are convinced that it is possible to create a machine
of this sort, because they share Turing’s view that building such a machine is just a
matter of storage and computation. This in turn reflects a common assumption that
human cognition is itself just a matter of storage and computation. Searle’s Chinese
room argument (Searle, 1980) picks up on this point, and shows that, even if a machine
could be programmed in a way that provides a perfect emulation of a human being’s
overt behaviour when engaging in dialogue, it would still be problematic to conclude
from this that the machine had any counterpart of human understanding or of human
consciousness of meaning.
Interestingly, Turing already (at §4 of his 1950 paper) provides what, in our current
context, can be interpreted as a rejoinder to this part of Searle’s argument, arguing that
1We provide more details about the setup of the test at the beginning of section 3 below.
2Op. cit., §6. We note that these criteria seem quite arbitrary. They amount to what, in software
engineering, one would call a “hack”, rather than to a criterion of the sort that one might use in
science. Indeed, as has often been pointed out, Turing’s criterion does not in fact test whether a
machine has the ability to think, but rather only whether the machine has the ability to fool 70% of
a population of average interrogators for 5 minutes.
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to follow Searle would be to commit oneself to a solipsistic position. This is because we
ourselves, from the perspective of our own consciousness, do not know whether another
human being has self-consciousness except to the degree that we can infer this from
dialogue. If we can have a credible dialogue with a machine, therefore, then Turing holds
that we should adopt the same “polite convention that everyone thinks” and apply it
to the machine also. Here however Turing commits the fallacy of petitio principii, since
he presupposes an equivalence between dialogue-ability (as established on the basis of
his criterion) and possession of consciousness, which is precisely what his argument is
setting out to prove.
1.1 AI conversation emulation and its failures
Conversation machines – which are what is needed in order to pass the Turing test – are
in fact already being built. Efforts are directed mainly towards what are called dialogue
systems, or in other words systems able to engage in two-party conversations, which
are optimistically projected to be widely used in commercial agent-based applications
in areas such as travel booking or service scheduling. However, despite major efforts –
from ELIZA (Weizenbaum, 1966) to the computer-driven dialogue systems of the present
day (including Siri and Alexa) – nothing close to dialogue emulation has thus far been
achieved.3 This is so even in spite of the fact that the machines we have today surpass the
storage capacity and computing power Turing was estimating in 1950 would be required
for his “learning machine”.
The tenacious optimism in the field is, we hold, based on the one hand on an unrealistic
view of human cognitive behaviour and on the other hand on a series of impressive
successes in reinforcement learning, for example in solving the game of Go (Silver et al.,
2016) or achieving mastery in first-person shooter games such as Doom and Counter-
Strike.
Counting against this optimism, however, is the repeated failure of attempts to build
machines able to perform in a satisfactory way in dialogue with humans. This rests, we
believe, on the radical complexity of human language use, something first recognized by
philosophers starting as early as Thomas Reid (Schuhmann and Smith, 1990), later by
Schopenhauer4, and then by Adolf Reinach (Mulligan, 1987).
Most important for our purposes, however, is Wittgenstein who, at Philosophical In-
vestigations 23, asks: “How many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question,
and command? – There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we
call ‘symbols’, ‘words’, ‘sentences’. And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given
once for all; new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into
existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.”
3See 4.3.2 below.
4“It is by the help of language alone that reason accomplishes its most important achievements, – the
united action of several individuals, the planned cooperation of many thousands, civilisation, the
state; also science, the storing up of experience, the uniting of common properties in one concept,
the communication of truth, the spread of error, thoughts and poems, dogmas and superstitions.”
The World as Will and Representations, §8.
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Wittgenstein then asks his reader to review the multiplicity of language-games in the
following examples, and in others:
- Giving orders, and obeying them,
- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements,
- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing),
- Reporting an event,
- Speculating about an event,
- Forming and testing a hypothesis,
- Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams,
- Making up a story; and reading it,
- Play-acting,
- Singing catches,
- Guessing riddles,
- Making a joke; telling it,
- Solving a problem in practical arithmetic,
- Translating from one language into another,
- Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
Wittgenstein here reveals a huge landscape of variance in natural language utterance,
and his initial probings of this landscape gave way to a significant enhancement in our
understanding of how (especially spoken) language works through the contributions of
philosophers such as Austin and Grice, since consolidated in the huge body of research
in linguistic semantics and pragmatics conducted since the 1950s, upon which we draw
extensively in what follows.
1.2 Main arguments of this paper
We take as our starting point the more than 175-year-old statement made by Ada
Lovelace to the effect that the Analytical Engine5 “has no pretensions to originate any-
thing. It can do [only] whatever we know how to order it to perform” (Lovelace and
Menabrea, 1843). The machine will not develop consciousness or motives or intentions,
and thus not learn in the way humans do, until we know how to tell it to do so, and to
achieve this, we would have to create models of these human characteristics. However
– and this is a point often made by Turing himself – we can only model what we can
describe mathematically.6 Viewed from this perspective, the idea that consciousness or
motives or intentions will somehow emerge spontaneously when storage and computing
power reach a certain threshold is a product of magical thinking.
5This is the machine built by Charles Babbage which, as Turing points out (op. cit.), is mathematically
equivalent to a Turing machine.
6This is true, as we shall see below, even for cases in which machines create new patterns, as in
reinforcement learning, an AI approach founded on Markov decision process models (Sutton and
Barto, 2018), or adversarial learning. These are notable exceptions to the proposition that the
machine cannot learn anything new.
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1.2.1 Mathematical models of human dialogue
What, now, of the mathematical representation of human dialogues? A dialogue is a
stochastic temporal process. Some processes of this sort can be modelled mathematically,
using what are called stochastic models. But for this to be possible, we need to have a
collection of input-output tuples of data, where the inputs are connected to the outputs
probabilistically, which means that there is a certain (measurable) likelihood that a given
input will be associated with a given output (Landgrebe and Smith, 2019).
This is the basis of so-called “machine learning”, where (in the most straightforward
case) the learning process starts when we have collected large bodies of input data
together with output data humans create therefrom in situations of a given sort, for
example when humans identify spam in their email. Here the sender, subject and text
of an email serve as input while the human decision to put this email into the spam
folder provides the output. The process of training the machine with these data yields
a gigantically large equation that models the relationship between the input and output
data that have been fed into it. This model is narrowly tied to the training data that
generated it, and does not generalise. If the equation (the trained model) is applied to
new data, not drawn from the same distribution as the original training data, it will
compute undesired outputs.7
Only if we have a sufficiently large collection of input-output tuples, in which the
outputs have been appropriately tagged, can we use the data to train a machine so that
it is able, given new inputs sufficiently similar to those in the training data, to predict
corresponding outputs with a certain (useful) degree of accuracy.
But what ‘sufficiently large’ and ‘sufficiently similar’ mean, here, are questions of
mathematics. We shall see that when these questions are raised in relation to those sorts
of stochastic temporal processes which are human dialogues it becomes immediately clear
that there are two insurmountable hurdles to realizing the scenario in which a machine
would pass the Turing test, namely
1. that we could never have sufficiently large amounts of data to train it because the
variance in dialogue situations is as huge as the variance in human culture and
behaviour, and
2. that the processes in question do not meet the conditions needed for the application
of any known type of mathematical model.
We shall see that nothing has changed in this respect even with all the advances made
machine learning in recent years (including reinforcement learning (see 4.2.6) and un-
supervised sequence learning (see 4.3.4)), for again: the limitations on what machine
learning can do are of a mathematical nature.
We thus go one step further than Searle’s Chinese room in that we challenge the very
idea that a machine emulation of human conversational behaviour is possible at all.
7We deal with this matter at greater length in our discussion of the spam filter in (Landgrebe and
Smith, 2019).
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1.2.2 There can be no general AI
This conclusion regarding human dialogue allows the following syllogism concerning the
creation of general AI:
• There can be no mathematical models for the type of behaviour illustrated by
human dialogue.
• Therefore, there can be no computer programs implementing such models.
• Therefore, there can be no general AI.
This does not mean, however, that all is lost for AI in general. For we also review the
current state of the art in dialogue system building, and conclude by identifying what we
see as the potential for dialogue systems that would still be useful even though they fall
far short of the general AI that would be needed to pass the Turing test. This essay thus
complements our previous paper (Landgrebe and Smith, 2019), where we defended a
sceptical attitude to the current euphoria surrounding “deep neural networks”, while at
the same time pointing to AI applications which provide significant utility in addressing
specific sets of real-world problems.
2 The nature of human dialogues
People engage in dialogues in order to interact with other people to achieve certain ends
(berating, guiding, informing, persuading, socializing, and many more).
A dialogue – as opposed to a lecture or a poetry reading (which are examples of one-
way communication) – involves turn-taking: the participants take turns in speaking and
interpreting. The drivers of the conversation are our intentions, the goals we want to
achieve by means of our utterances (Grice, 1957; Austin, 1962; Searle, 1983).8 When
it is Mary’s turn to speak in a dialogue with Jack, she tries to fulfil her intentions
by conveying content meaningful to Jack. Mary’s intention may be to influence Jack’s
intentions through her utterances, as Mary in turn may be influenced by the utterances
of Jack. In this way, a conversation may bring about changes in the intentions of its
participants. This is sometimes even the explicit intent of the conversation, as when
people sit down together to reach decisions or to make plans.
Utterances and interpretations are occurrences. They take place in time and (more
or less) in sequence. Both involve the making of conscious and unconscious choices,
which are implicit in the sense that they are accessible to the dialogue partner – and to
any external human or machine observer – only indirectly, via the utterances to which
they lead. Acts of making choices, too, are occurrences, ordered in time in (rough)
synchrony with the associated acts of speaking and interpreting. However, all of these
occurrences take place against an enduring, and typically slowly changing, background
8If the dialogue arises spontaneously, only the first utterer may have an intention; but the interpreter
will very quickly form intentions of her own as soon as she is addressed, including the intention to
refuse engagement in a dialogue.
6
consisting not merely of the evolving linguistic competences of the interlocutors but
also of their respective personalities, habits and other elements drawn from their rich
personal biographies.
2.1 Habits, capabilities and intentions
These form what we shall call the ‘identity’ of a human being, by which we mean that
highly complex individual pattern of dispositions, both cognitive and affective, that
determines each person’s reactions to internal or external stimuli.9
Your identity, in this sense, results from the combination of genotypic and environ-
mental influences which affect your neural substrate as it develops through time.10
We can distinguish three main families of dispositions through the realization of which
our identity is manifested:
1. habits, tendencies, personality traits (to stutter, to yawn, to fret, to avoid com-
mitment, to bear grudges, to behave pompously, to behave honestly, . . . )
2. capabilities (to speak a language, to play the piano, to manage complex activities,
to do long division, to play championship tennis, to practice law, . . . )
3. intentions, goals, objectives (to pass an exam, to marry Jack, to impress Jack’s
mother, to lose weight, to heal the rift with your bother, . . . )
Our intentions are the drivers of our behaviour. Typically, they are short-lived, as in
the course of a dialogue about plans for supper, when intentions of both dialogue partic-
ipants may be adjusted with each successive utterance. Our habits and capabilities are
longer-lasting. They rest on more enduring patterns in the underlying neural substrate
and shape which intentions we develop and how (and whether) they are realized.
In spite of all the advances in neurology in recent years, this neural substrate is still
little understood. Indeed, it is not understood at all if we define ‘understanding’ as
the ability to model and predict. Thus, it cannot be captured in a formal, let alone
machine-processable, way, and the same applies to the array of dispositions – which we
share to a greater or lesser extent with our fellow human beings – which are founded
upon it. It is this array of dispositions that makes conversation (and indeed all use of
language, indeed all human activity) possible.
It shapes and determines the repertoire of both the types of speech acts that we have
at our disposal and also of the contents of those speech acts. At the same time, it ensures
that the deployment of this repertoire is to a large extent a matter of ingrained reflex –
or at least a matter over which we have only very fragmentary conscious control (Smith,
1987).
9The underlying account of dispositions is sketched in Hastings et al. (2011). This draws in turn on
the ontology framework described in Arp et al. (2015)
10Our ‘identity’ thus comes close to what Searle calls ‘The Background’ (Searle, 1979), of which Searle
says that it is at one and the same time (i) “derived from the entire congeries of relations which
each biological-social being has to the world around itself” and (ii) purely a matter of that being’s
neurophysiology. (Searle, 1983), p. 154.
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Realizations of our linguistic dispositions are triggered in various ways, including by
the utterances of our dialogue partners. Sometimes, such realizations involve conscious
choices, for instance the choice of whether to adopt a retaliatory or conciliatory tone in
response to a threatening utterance, or the choice of which answer to give to a difficult
(perhaps a trick) question. More often, however, selection takes place spontaneously and
unconsciously. It occurs, moreover, on a number of different levels, affecting both verbal
and non-verbal aspects of communication. Matters are made still more complicated by
the fact that the contexts in which communicative acts take place play a decisive role in
the formation of both utterances and interpretations (Fetzer, 2017). We shall see that
there are also multiple levels of such contexts. And, to make matters worse, the range
of possible choices is not static or stable (Verschueren (1999), p. 59). The result, as we
shall see, is that there are so many different variables involved in a communicative act
that the possibilities of forming an utterance are practically infinite.
2.2 Sources of variance in human dialogue
First, the utterer can draw on multiple sets of options at many levels of language pro-
duction, starting with: which language to use (for example when travelling in a foreign
country); the topic to be addressed; intonation, pitch, syntax, vocabulary, volume, as
well as code and style of language (brazen, cautious, elegant, pious, rough, wistful . . . );
and so on.
Second, the utterer can draw on a wide repertoire of non-verbal utterance accompani-
ments, such as gesture, mimicry, gaze, posture. These elements (documented in section
2.5) evince (or mask) intentions of the speaker, which can be argumentative, jocular,
overbearing, serious, submissive, supplicative, teasing, threatening, and so forth (Smith
(2001), section 4).
The utterer, according to her intentions of the moment, uses combinations of elements
from the mentioned levels of language production as she adjusts (again, normally un-
consciously) to the responses of the recipient in accordance with the physical (temporal,
spatial), and social and conversational context within which the conversation takes place.
The recipient of an utterance will similarly face many options on the basis of which to
attribute meaning to the utterances he hears. He can be suspicious, trusting, fully or
only partially attentive, and so on. Which options are engaged on either side may of
course change as the conversation unfolds, either for reasons internal to the content of
the conversation itself, or because the interlocutors are influenced, by external factors
such as effects of alcohol, or inclement weather.
2.2.1 Levels of language production and interpretation
To document the resultant enormous potential for variation in dialogue interactions, we
describe in detail the different levels on which the context and structure of the dialogue
and the form of its dynamic interaction processes are determined.
Loosely following Verschueren (1999), we distinguish five levels of language production
and interpretation, namely:
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1. context (including the identities of the interlocutors),
2. language economics (deixis and implicit meaning),
3. dialogue structure (words, sentences, gestures, . . . ) 11,
4. force/modality,
5. dialogue dynamics.
When humans engage in conversation all of these levels interact. Their separate treat-
ment here is necessary merely in order to enable systematic description; in reality they
can never be properly spliced apart.
2.3 Types of dialogue context
The dialogue context is a “setting”, where this term is to be understood in a broad
sense to embrace, for instance: one’s place at the dinner table, one’s place in society, a
geographical place, the time of day at which a dialogue occurs, and many more (Barker,
1968). In each case the context is determined by an interplay between the wider en-
vironment and the identities of the parties involved, including their mental attitudes,
intentions, and capabilities.
Contexts can be nested: a dialogue relating to the food on the dinner table suddenly
switches its context as the diners become aware that someone is banging hard on the
front door.
In addition, such contexts are marked not by sharp boundaries but by what is called a
“horizon” of possibilities, for example the possibility that our dialogue partner might be
lying, or intending to report our conversation to his superiors. The horizon of a spatial
context, for instance, might include the possibility of leaving through the back door; the
horizon of a temporal context that one’s husband may return at any moment. For each
interlocutor, the dialogue context is thus in some ways analogous to the visual field of
an individual subject: now more things now fewer things fall within its compass. And
the things which do fall within its compass do so in a way that encompasses a penumbra
of possibilities.12 Consider for example how facial expressions become apparent as we
move closer to persons in our visual field, and how these facial expressions themselves
bring to light new potentialities for greeting and embracing.
In each dialogue, each dialogue participant will have at any given stage a dialogue
horizon, which results from the interaction of all his salient dialogue contexts at that
11We follow Verschueren (op. cit.) in using the term “structure” to designate what might otherwise be
referred to as “content” or “material”. Utterance structure can be both verbal and non-verbal (for
example when it involves use of gestures).
12Compare Husserl: “The world is pregiven to us, the waking, always somehow practically interested
subjects, not occasionally but always and necessarily as universal field of all actual and possible
practice, as horizon.” In our natural, normal life “we move in a current of ever new experiences,
judgments, valuations, decisions”, in each of which consciousness “is directed towards objects in its
surrounding world” surrounded by a horizon of fluently moving potentialities (Husserl (1989), pp.
142, 149).
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stage. This dialogue horizon encompasses all possibilities that fall within his intentional
scope in the widest sense, as determined not only by his linguistic competences and
biography, but also by the social and cultural setting of the dialogue, by contextual
factors relating to the time and space in which it occurs, and by his intentions of the
moment. The way each interlocutor shifts his intentions alters his dialogue horizon,
which in turn determines the way he perceives new utterance material. This then has
a dynamic effect on new intentions, which further shape his interpretation and the way
new speech acts are formed, new contexts for interpretation are created.
2.3.1 Social, cultural and environmental contexts
2.3.1.1 Social context is the social setting of the conversation (W. Hanks, 1996), for
example the context of a family outing, of two strangers bumping into each other on
a railway platform, of a teacher berating a failing student, of a session in parliament.
As the latter cases make clear, a social context may include institutional elements, and
in such cases we can refer also to an institutional context. The social context exists in
virtue of the fact that the participants in the conversation have formally or informally
defined roles in virtue of which they are subject to certain norms. The social and
institutional rewards and sanctions associated with these norms then form part of the
dialogue horizon. They influence not only what the dialogue partners say (and what
they do not say), but also the ways they speak and act.
2.3.1.2 Cultural context is a special sub-type of social context. It is the setting created
by those socialisation patterns which come into play where the participants in a dialogue
draw on a common cultural background passed on from one generation to the next. The
cultural context is thus determined by those habits, norms and values which result from
similar types of upbringing, education, and so forth.
The social context of a conversation constrains in each case the space of permissible
utterances. The broadest space is obtained where social peers speak in private, the
narrowest when institutional or social inferiors and superiors speak in an institutional
setting, for example judge and defendant in a criminal case. (We note that even here both
parties will sometimes step outside the institutionally accepted norms. As in every other
type of dialogue, the possibility that a participant forms the desire, for example, to shock
or bamboozle his interlocutor can never be ruled out.) On the other hand, if dialogue
partners do not share any cultural context or tradition, and do not know about each
other’s social roles, then they will likely choose a very general communication context
that is appropriate simply for an encounter between fellow humans (or between fellow
human beings belonging, for example, to a given age cohort). Turing’s test resembles a
context of this sort; the interrogator does not know his interlocutors. This increases the
likelihood of shallow (dull) conversations.
2.3.1.3 Contextual constraints on language use There is a variety of social contexts
which constrain our dispositions and choices when producing language, and conversa-
tion participants may engage one or more of these within a single conversation. Each
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determines a particular variety (a “code” or “register”) of the language used in the
conversation. A sociolect is an expression of the constrained dispositions and choices
of those language users who share a social background resulting from a shared pattern
of socialisation. Age cohorts also have sociolects, as do criminals (so-called ‘Rotwelsch’
or criminal cant). A dialect is a sociolect of those language users who share a social
background that is regionally determined. A grapholect is a written language as stan-
dardized for example in a dictionary. A cognolect reflects the constraints imposed on an
utterer by her intellectual abilities and education level, which may include a common
professional or disciplinary socialization in, for example, architecture or rap music.
2.3.2 Spatial and temporal context
Spatial context is the site of the dialogue, formed by the physical place (the park bench,
spaceship, bus, hospital, pub, bed, and so on) in which it takes place. Temporal context
is the time (dusk, Christmas, tea break) in which the dialogue takes place. Both temporal
and spatial context can include (at several levels) other spaces and times nested within
them, for instance when a dialogue happens at one time but the interlocutors speak
about other times and about their temporal order. Consider a conversation between
a police officer and the various parties, including witnesses, involved in a car accident.
Consider such a conversation where, among the various parties, there are some who
speak different languages.
Both spatial and temporal context are determined in part by the communication
channel used in the dialogue. This can be local (which means: with physical presence)
or remote. It can be spoken versus written, and direct versus asynchronous, with different
degrees of delay (such as chat – text message – email – letter). Skype combines verbal,
visual and textual (chat) elements, and both of the latter can be enhanced in turn with
emojis. Again, there are different sorts of rules and norms associated with different sorts
of channel, and different channels are more or less adequate or appropriate to different
sorts of communication. A text message channel may be adequate for announcing one’s
arrival time; not however for expressing condolence on the occasion of someone’s death
(Westmyer et al., 1998).
2.3.2.1 Environmental context is the setting formed by that part of the world in which
the conversation takes place. It is a combination of spatial and social context, and
thus includes both physical and social constraints. It is made up of what Barker calls
“ecological units” (Barker, 1968), for example the kitchen while Raymond is having
breakfast, the interior of the school bus while he is travelling to school, his classroom
while a lesson is taking place, the school yard during break.13
The environmental contexts of participants in a dialogue may differ, as for example
when Mary is driving and Jack, sitting next to her, is communicating navigation instruc-
tions. Here the environmental contexts share in common the car interior, the road, the
route ahead, the destination. Jack’s environmental context includes in addition the map
13Wright and Barker (1951) records a sequence of some 1000s of settings through which one boy pro-
gresses in a single day.
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he is using to navigate; Mary’s environmental context includes the entire set of driver
affordances making up the car cockpit. That dialogues of this sort so often go wrong
rests in part on the fact that there are different ways in which space itself is demarcated
in different registers (Matthiessen and Kashyap, 2014).
Relations between environmental contexts may involve also elements of territoriality,
for example when Jack seeks to engage Mary in dialogue by inserting himself into her
personal space through displays of dominance or enticement. Environmental context also
comprises those environments where political or military power is projected (Popitz,
2017), such as the layout of a prison in which an overseer can interact via intercom
with the prison inmates. Here the environmental context of the overseer comprehends
his fellow prison officers together with multiple prison security, video surveillance and
communication systems; the environmental context of the inmate extends hardly beyond
the walls of her cell.
2.3.3 Discourse context and interpretation
The dialogue is its own context at all levels of language production and interpretation.
What this means is that, just as the constituents of a sentence contextualise each other,
so do the successive sentences themselves. Each utterance is contextualised by its pre-
ceding utterances, and potential future utterances form part of the context horizon of
each present utterance. The degree by which preceding statements influence the inter-
pretation of the current statement is called the contextual weight of these statements.
In prototypical conversations this weight decreases over time, so that the immediately
preceding utterance has the strongest weight and more remote utterances have less as
they fall away into the background. There are however cases where interlocutors can
suddenly reach back to utterances made much earlier in the dialogue and bring them
once more into the foreground.
One important family of cases of this sort results from misunderstandings. We pointed
out already that the acts of choosing how to respond to a dialogue utterance are implicit.
The same applies also to the interpretations of an utterance on the part of the receiver.
The latter are observable only indirectly – via the utterances the interpreter produces
after a role switch between the interlocutors has occurred. This implicitness of the
interpretation often forces an utterer to revise a statement from further back in the
conversation when he realises, on the basis of how his interlocutor is now responding,
that he has been misunderstood.
2.4 Discourse economy: implicit meaning
Discourse economy is the feature of language production which requires the interpreter
to take account of context for interpretation. This is because in almost all dialogues
the intended meaning remains partially implicit. Such implicit meaning is generated
almost always unconsciously, because parties to a dialogue automatically assume that
they share sufficient general as well as context-specific knowledge to allow each of them
to contextualise successfully the utterances of the other. Thus, they can still effectuate
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an adequate interpretation, even though not everything is said explicitly. This is of
importance not least because it reflects the way in which the structure of the dialogue
is influenced by interactions between the respective identities of its participants, above
all by shared intentions and shared (linguistic and other) capabilities.
Verschueren gives an example of our almost universal reliance on implicitness by de-
scribing his attempt to make fully explicit the colloquial statement: “Go anywhere
today?” This resulted in a text of 15 lines that still does not achieve full explicitness
(op. cit., p. 26). The major reason for such reliance turns on the need for economy
in use of language. The speaker will in normal circumstances want to obtain from her
speech acts maximal effect in a limited time, and implicitness at the right level allows
her to pass over details that would otherwise disturb the conversational flow or be boring
to the interlocutor. Avoiding explicitness can also be used as a conversational tactic, for
example to maintain politeness or mask deception.
To achieve a dialogue that is productive on both sides, the preponderance of implicit
meaning on the side of what is communicated by the utterer needs to be understood by
the interpreter in a way that is close to the utterer’s intention. In his Studies in the Way
of Words, Grice (1989) formulates in this connection what he calls the “Cooperative
Principle”, in which he recognises not only the need for dialogue economy but also
its two-sided nature. For cooperativeness, as Grice understands it, incorporates both a
maxim of quantity – be as informative as you possibly can, and give as much information
as is needed – and a maxim of manner – be as clear, as brief, and as orderly as you can in
what you say, and avoid ambiguity. These requirements are clearly in competition with
each other; if brevity is taken too far, for example, then the interlocutors will typically
later require more explicitness in order to resolve potential misunderstandings.
2.4.1 Deixis
The most important form of implicit meaning is deixis, which is the use of language
elements whose reference is determined by the specific context of an utterance. Deictic
expressions – such as “him”, “next week”, “there” – need to be interpreted by the receiver
using contextual clues.14 Four important forms of deixis are: person deixis, temporal
deixis, spatial deixis and discourse deixis.
2.4.1.1 Person deixis means: references to a person, where who the person is can be
inferred only if contextual information is available (Meibauer, 2001; Sidnell and Enfield,
2017). The utterer knows who he himself is, and in the setting of a face-to-face com-
munication the interpreter knows who the utterer is, and is thus able to resolve the
deictic pronouns “I” and “you”. Not, however, in other settings, for instance in the case
14Talmy (2018) provides a survey of such cues as part of an account of how the utterer in a dialogue
draws the attention of the interpreter to the particular entity that she wants to communicate about
by using both speech-external and speech-internal context. He describes the vast array of strategies
humans use to bring this about, given that the utterer cannot somehow reach into the hearer’s mind
and directly place his focus of attention on that target.
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of conversations using a teleprinter (as in one form of the Turing test as described by
Turing himself in 1950).
2.4.1.2 Spatial deixis is a phenomenon arising when reference to space requires context
for disambiguation (Lyons, 1977). It can be seen at work in the use of prepositions such
as “in”, “out”, “below”; also of verbs such as “enter”, “go to”, “leave”; of adverbs such
as “here”, “there”; and of demonstrative pronouns such as “these” and “those”. For
example, the utterance “Let’s go downtown” when uttered in Berlin needs context to
be disambiguated, since “downtown” can mean (at least) Berlin Zoologischer Garten
and Berlin Mitte. Between 1961 and 1990 the term “Berlin” itself needed context for
disambiguation.
2.4.1.3 Temporal deixis is the analogous phenomenon involving reference to time (Lyons,
1977). To resolve the meaning of utterances like “Yesterday Trump met Kim” or “Next
February I will travel to Rome” event time point, time point of utterance and reference
time scale need to be applied in disambiguation (Thomsen and Smith, 2018).
The need to keep track of temporal order inside a dialogue is illustrated by a statement
such as
(1) After Paris I need to get to Abbeville before nightfall.
This involves four temporal references, one (implicit) present and three (explicit) in suc-
cessive futures, as well as three spatial references: present location at time of utterance
(implicit), Paris and Abbeville (explicit). We can use this example to illustrate how the
context and horizon of a conversation influence each other mutually. On the one hand,
if the sentence is used in a conversation between two British tourists planning a trip
from Paris to Normandy, the horizon might include potential closing times on Somme
battlefield memorial sites. If, on the other hand, it is used in a conversation between
two Oklahoma truck drivers, then the dialogue horizon might include potential traffic
holdups on Route 7 on the way from Paris, Texas to Abbeville, Louisiana.
2.4.1.4 Discourse deixis is the usage of an utterance in a conversation to refer to this
utterance itself or to previous or future parts of the conversation (Levinson, 1983). Ex-
amples are: “What you just said contradicts your previous statements”, or “So what does
it feel like, participating in a conversation like this one?”; or again: “This conversation
must stop immediately!” or “I contest the legitimacy of these entire proceedings!” While
change in dialogue horizon normally takes place gradually, and without being noticed,
the employment of discourse deixis brings the ongoing dynamics of horizon change into
the foreground. Discourse deixis is often an element of a meta-discourse, for example
when three persons leave the room and then one of the remaining interlocutors says:
“That was a strange conversation.”
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2.4.2 Other forms of implicit meaning
2.4.2.1 Non-deictic reference is a way of expressing the relation to an entity using
a fixed reference, as in proper names (such as “G. Pico de la Mirandola”) or definite
descriptions (like “the highest mountain in Europe”) (Abbott, 2017). Proper names
and other fixed references, too, require background (world) knowledge to be interpreted
correctly.
2.4.2.2 Presupposition is the usage of an implicit unit of meaning in a way that im-
plies that the interpreter will have to draw on contextual knowledge to understand the
intended meaning, as in the sentence “Let us meet the chancellor”, which carries the
presupposition that the interlocutor knows who the chancellor is. A variant type of
presupposition (as in: “Have you stopped beating your wife?”) is sometimes used as a
way of tricking a dialogue partner in unfriendly interactions.
2.4.2.3 Implicature occurs where there is a unit of meaning which the speaker does not
make explicit in his utterance, but which the interpreter can deduce from this utterance.
Huang (2017) gives the following example: “The soup is warm” implies that the soup
is neither hot nor cold. This differs from presupposition, because the implication can
be resolved without background knowledge; only minimal language competence at the
lexeme level is required.
2.5 Structural elements of dialogue
Next to context, another important layer contributing to dialogue variance arises from
choice of language structure, including both verbal structures (utterances) and non-
verbal structures (for example gestures).
Layers of structure are, from the coarse to the fine-grained:15
1. non-verbal level: including facial expression, gestures and body language,
2. whole language level: including language choice, language code and language style,
3. level of single dialogue contributions: sentential and suprasentential utterance
units,
4. level of morphemes and words,
5. level of sound structures.
15Ingarden (1973), pp. 29f., identifies a similar pattern of layers in his analysis of the ontology of the
literary work of art, and points out how each can contribute to the aesthetic quality of the work as a
whole. He emphasises that, despite the heterogeneous character of these layers, the work nonetheless
constitutes an organic unity, since the layers are unified unproblematically by the reader in virtue of
the dimension of meaning which runs through them all. Something similar applies in the dialogue
case, though here there are two – potentially conflicting – chains of meaning which unify the layers,
one for each of the two dialogue partners.
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2.5.1 Non-verbal structural elements of dialogue
Facial expression, glances, gestures and body language are important ways in which uses
of language are supported by non-verbal structures (Verschueren (1999), p 100f.). All of
them can potentially transform the sense of a verbal utterance, so that even a statement
of condolence can be accompanied by gestures and facial expressions that make it appear
cynical to the interpreter. In negotiations (and negotiation-based games such as poker)
body language and facial impression are indispensable to obtaining the desired results.
It has been shown that their effect on the interpretation of contexts, situations and even
the personality of the interlocutor is quite strong (Ambady and Rosenthali, 1992). Sign
language is also an important non-verbal component of dialogue, and is used very often
to disambiguate spatial from person deixis, for example by means of pointing (Sidnell
and Enfield, 2017).
2.5.2 Language code and style
Code – also called “register” – is a matter of the language choices systematically made
by a social group, such as the inhabitants of an area or the members of a social class
or profession. Dialogue participants can switch codes, for example, to convey special
meaning or emphasis, or to communicate mockery.
Style concerns the level of formality of language use (Verschueren, 1999); a speaker
may switch, for example, to a more aggressive style, in order to intimidate or punish his
dialogue partner. Both code and style are important dimensions of variance in utterance
formation and interpretation.
2.5.3 Sentential and suprasentential utterances
A sentential utterance expresses a relatively closed unit of meaning encompassing the
basic functions of reference and predication. Subkinds are: statement, question, im-
perative, request and exclamation (Du¨rscheid, 2012). Statements are characterised by
features such as reference (subject in noun phrase) and predication (verb phrase). Typ-
ically, they are expressed as complete sentences, but ellipses are also used, as in “Guilty,
your honour”). A suprasentential utterance is a sequence of sentential utterances which
the utterer uses to optimise the fulfilment of her intentions by conveying a complex
meaning. The way this is done depends on context.
2.5.3.1 Incompleteness and ellipses Sentential and suprasentential utterances are of-
ten incomplete or elliptical. This may result from interruption or the inability of the
speaker to finish his thought. But often, such utterances can be completed by elements
of the situation and are not pragmatically incomplete (Mulligan, 1997). In such cases
humans can interpret even incomplete utterances in a sense that is close to the meaning
intended by the utterer.
2.5.3.2 Force and modality Force describes utterance styles characteristic of assertion,
command, request, question, and so forth. In addition, there are varying degrees of
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force, so that, depending on the emotional involvement and inclinations of the speaker,
a request to obtain something might be phrased either as a question or as an imperative.
With Frege (1879) and Searle (1979) one might take the view that an expressed propo-
sition can be evaluated independently of the force with which it is communicated. P.
Hanks (2007), however, gives strong evidence to the effect that propositional content and
force interact and must be understood together. Thus, while logicians and computer sci-
entists have sometimes held that the linguistic subdiscipline of semantics can hold itself
cleanly separate from concerns with matters of pragmatics, a view of this sort cannot be
maintained even for the language used in silent monologue (Clark, 1996). Such a view
will certainly be inadequate when it comes to that sort of language whose mastery is
needed to pass the Turing test.
The philosopher’s understanding of force is closely related to the linguistic notion of
modality, which describes aspects of attitude – of how the utterer relates to his utter-
ance, signalling properties such as: degree of certainty, optionality, doubt, vagueness,
possibility, necessity, and so forth (Verschueren, 1999).
But modality as understood by linguists comprehends also other aspects of the ut-
terer’s attitude, for example that he is joking, lying, flattering, ordering, arguing, inter-
rogating, pleading. The verbal expression of modality is often combined with non-verbal
language-supporting elements (see 2.5.1), for example when the utterer is holding a gun
to the head of the interpreter, or is kneeling before the interpreter in the middle of the
street while holding a ring in his hand.
2.5.4 Lexemes
Lexemes are the carriers of the minimal units of linguistic meaning – for example run
or hat. The building blocks of sentences are lexemes in their inflected forms, which are
called wordforms – for example runs, ran, running or hats, hat’s, behatted. For any given
language there is a relatively small set of lexemes that has to cover a very wide range
of possible topics. This is because it is not possible to have an exact word for each and
every aspect of reality if the size of the lexicon is to be kept small enough that it can
be managed by a single human being. Lexemes are therefore prototypes (Rosch, 1975).
They obtain part of their meaning from the context created by the other lexemes they
are used with in a sentence, as well as by all the other contextual dimensions identified
above. For example, the lexeme freedom has a very different meaning in (2) and (3):
(2) Do not clutter my desk with stuff, I need freedom to move.
(3) We want freedom of speech!
Lexemes are organised in hierarchies of greater and lesser generality. Depending on
intention and context, lexemes of varying degrees of abstraction may be chosen in the
course of a single dialogue. In everyday usage it is the mid-level that dominates. For
instance, when talking about pets, the participants in a dialogue will typically use mid-
level terms such as “dog” or “cat” rather than the low-level “dachshund” or the high-level
“animal”. Something similar holds when we describe an ailment (where we refer in a
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dialogue to a fracture of the foot, rather than of the fifth metatarsal bone). When we
introduce ourselves in a dialogue, we (prototypically) talk about our place of origin by
referring to city or region rather than to neighbourhood or street. Utterers, normally
unconsciously, select the level of abstraction/generality that is salient to the dialogue
context (compare 2.3.3).
2.5.5 Sound structure
In its sound structure, speech is built out of elementary phonetic segments (vowels
and consonants), which are combined into composite sounds beginning with syllables
and words and proceeding to entire sentential and supersentential utterances. We can
compare the former to single notes in music, and the latter to melodic structures formed
by notes in sequential combination.16 Each entire utterance is made with a specific
prosody, by which is meant that aspect of speech sound that inheres in composite sound
units. Among the various dimensions of prosody, intonation and pace are the most
important.
Variations in intonation, for example suddenly switching to a high-pitched voice, are
used to express emotions or attitudes of the speaker, or to distinguish sentential units of
different modalities (for example statements from questions), or for purposes of empha-
sizing or highlighting certain aspects of the dialogue, or to regulate the conversational
flow.17 Another aspect of sound structure that can influence interpretation is voice
quality, such as the use of a soft or hard voice, or the use of mere vocal cues such as
throat-clearing, grunts, sniffs, unintelligibly muttering under one’s breath.18
Pace comprises rhythm, speed – for example speeding up or pausing, hesitating in
mid-sentence – all of which can be selected, consciously or unconsciously, to shape the
ways an utterance or sequence of utterances is interpreted. Pausing can also be used as
a device to signal to one’s interlocutor that a conversation is reaching its end. Different
types and layers of sound can be used together, for example when a dialogue partner
responds to an utterance with a slow hand clap, or when Romeo serenades his sweetheart
with musical accompaniment.
2.6 Dialogue dynamics
The production of meaning in the course of a dialogue is a highly dynamic process,
which involves all of the levels distinguished above: the intentions of the interlocutors,
16The elementary phonetic segments of vocal utterances have features comparable to the pitch, overtone
composition, and amplitude of single notes in music.
17Note that the pitch variation in intonation is different from tone, another type of pitch modulation,
that is used to distinguish grammatical or lexical meaning. In Mandarin, for example, lexemes are
differentiated via differences in what is called syllable pitch.
18We focus here on sound structure as it appears in the flow of a spoken dialogue. But sound structure
can play a role, too, in written dialogue, for example when our minds associate the words in an email
message with a certain intonation. This is an example of the subtlety and massive complexity of
language interpretation as it occurs in the dynamic flow of inner mental experience.
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the dialogue horizon generated by the interaction of relevant dialogue contexts (see 2.3),
deixis and other forms of implicit meaning, and all the dialogue’s structural elements.
Both interlocutors start the dialogue with certain intentions. As the dialogue evolves,
these intentions change as they dynamically drive the meanings the interlocuters want to
convey to each other. Depending on how they interpret each other’s utterances, each can
draw on a huge variety of interacting combinations of the structural elements involved
in utterance production. Moreover, while this is happening, the dialogue horizon itself is
evolving: some things move into the field of what is relevant to the dialogue, other things
fall away. The contributions of each interlocutor modify the dialogue contexts that had
existed when the dialogue began. In some cases the dialogue itself becomes on its own
account an important (even the most important) context. When a dialogue uses its own
unfolding history as context in this way, this leads to a refocussing of all earlier contexts,
and this refocussing then influences how subsequent (unconscious and conscious) choices
will be made in utterance formation and interpretation as the conversation proceeds.
2.6.1 Dialogue flow
In a prototypical dialogue, the interlocutors take turns. The roles of utterer and inter-
preter change periodically, and this switching of roles determines the role context of the
dialogue participants. Either each interlocutor waits for the other to finish his utterance
before replying, or other principles of turn-taking are used, for example that questions
should be followed by answers (as in Turing’s vision of his own test) or that greetings
expect a greeting in return (Sacks et al., 1974).19 These principles seem to be universally
valid, in the sense that they are found in all human cultures (Schegloff, 2017; Stivers
et al., 2009).
2.6.2 Interruptions
Conversational turn-taking is displayed in its ideal form in the strings of characters
printed by a teleprinter on a moving paper tape, where only one person can have control
over the input mechanism at any one time. This ideal form is illustrated also by a pub-
lished interview after an editor has worked to create a polished textual flow. In actually
occurring spoken dialogues, however, there are of course frequent deviations from this
ideal. The utterer may pause or hesitate or stutter, create false starts, make mistakes,
interrupt herself or try to add retrospective corrections to what she has said earlier, sud-
denly change the subject of the dialogue entirely. The interpreter may seize the speaker
role by forcing a role switch before the utterer has finished her statement. If the utterer
does not yield to the interruption, this may lead to utterances occurring simultaneously,
so that the flow of meaning transmission breaks. Sometimes, the interpreter anticipates
the next statement of the utterer and takes a turn before the latter finishes. All these
deviations increase the complexity of the role context and add to the pressures on the
19Turns can also be guided using what (Sacks op. cit.) calls turn-constructional units, an important
type of which are “possible completion points”, which are signals in the dialogue that indicate the
opportunity for a role switch.
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dialogue participants both in forming and in interpreting dialogue utterances. They
often go hand in hand with emotional layers to the dialogue flow, which support specific
sorts of interpretation of dialogue utterances, for example where one dialogue partner
seeks to influence the other by (as we say) playing on his emotions.
2.7 Concluding remarks on dialogue variance
We invite the reader to note not merely the many levels of variance in dialogues – the
many more or less independent dimensions of variation that have been documented by
both philosophers and linguists – but also the degree to which these variations depend
on multiple factors (indeed multiple levels of multiple factors) both inside and outside
the dialogue itself, factors that can extend to include almost any matter within the
biographies and within the scope of the knowledge and interests of the dialogue partners.
We note also the degree to which many of these factors are a matter of continuous
variation in the sense that the range of options forms a continuum, as for example
between speaking with a soft and a loud voice, or with a calm and an angry voice.
Movements along multiple such continua may take place within a single dialogue, and
when such movements are effected by one dialogue partner they will typically call forth
some concordant movement on the side of her interlocutor.
In all respects, indeed, preserving the flow of a dialogue rests on the capacity of humans
to adjust their contributions to fit those of the dialogue partner, for example to adjust
their respective intentions. This capacity is applied even in the most heated of disputes
between friends or lovers, where even the most acrimonious of dialogue partners are
able to maintain a conversation flow for considerable periods of time. This is achieved
through a type of homeostatic process, whereby, when the conversation seems to be
going completely off the rails, one or other partner succeeds in pulling it back from the
brink and initiating another phase of what is once more recognizable as coherent verbal
exchange.
3 Why machines cannot conduct real dialogues
In introducing his “new form of the problem” whether machines can think (Turing,
1950), Turing describes a second sort of “imitation game”, one in which an interrogator
(Turing’s own word) would attempt to determine, on the basis of their answers to a series
of questions, which of two persons was a man, and which a woman. The woman, here,
is an ally of the interrogator, and has the strategy of telling the truth about herself, for
example when answering questions about hairstyle or taste in clothes. The man, on the
other hand, has the strategy of fooling the interrogator so that he will make the wrong
decision.
The interrogator, for his part, must, precisely, interrogate. This means: try to gain the
advantage by using the sorts of techniques interrogators use in other contexts in order
to detect gaps, contradictions, confabulations and denials on the part of an interrogee
(Walton, 2003). This means potentially also: drawing on all the combinations of levels of
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style, modality, prosody, facial gesture and posture distinguished in the above, including
pleading, chastising, banging the table, until he gets the answers he wants.
In the Turing test proper, now, the interrogees are a human being and a machine.
The former has a role similar to that of the woman in the foregoing, and thus adopts
the strategy of telling the truth about herself. The machine, on the other hand, is
programmed to attempt to fool the interrogator.
We have already raised doubts as to whether a demonstration that a machine is able
to fool an interrogator in at least 70% of a set of five-minute rounds would truly provide
evidence for the claim that a machine is in fact thinking. We can now also point out
that these conditions do not do justice to what is involved in a genuine interrogation.
Most importantly, meeting them would not, in our view, demonstrate general AI.
A demonstration that a machine is able to fool an interrogator purely on the basis
of a written exchange – for example through the vehicle of a teleprinter – would also
not demonstrate general AI. For it would not come close to testing the machine’s ability
to emulate the “general experiential understanding of its environments that humans
possess”.20 Very many of the sources of variance which we must command in order to
achieve mastery of human dialogue are conveyed through what the dialogue participant
sees or hears.21 Accordingly, we will complement the rather weak form of the test
proposed by Turing himself with what we shall call the strong Turing test, which would
require:
1. that the machine has the capability to engage with a human interrogator in dia-
logues of arbitrary length (we postulate that this will in practice be of the order
of 4-6 hours, which was the typical length of an interrogation segment performed
by one Stasi officer in the days of the DDR);
2. that the turns in such a dialogue are not restricted to cases where the machine
merely reacts to a human trigger, such as in a succession of question-answer-pairs;
rather, the interlocutors should behave exactly as they would in a normal dialogue;
3. that the dialogue would be – if not face-to-face – then at least in spoken form;22
and
4. that the machine (and thus also the human interrogee) would see the interrogator,
since, if it is to pass the test, the machine has to demonstrate that it can react
appropriately to the whole habitus of its human dialogue partner and not just to
her speech.23
20See again Muehlhauser (2013).
21Ny´ıri (1989) describes how, in focusing on language use in his theory of meaning, Wittgenstein in
effect reintroduces into philosophy a feeling for language as oral discourse. For Wittgenstein, the
experience of spoken – rather than written – language is experience of language alive.
22A spoken dialogue of this sort would require a solution to the (hard) problem of engineering a machine
with convincing voice production.
23The interrogator should not of course see her two interlocutors, for otherwise she would be in a position
to recognize the machine on the basis of how it looks.
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We believe that a machine convincing a human interrogator under these conditions
would indeed indicate the realisation of general AI.
3.1 Human and machine biography
When a mentally healthy human being24 engages in conversation, she is able to draw
on her entire personal history and repertoire of capabilities not just of a linguistic na-
ture, but also all the capabilities she has acquired in navigating all aspects of reality
throughout her life. She is able to manifest, in other words, her identity.
Many of the conversations in which humans engage at least touch upon biography and
identity. Humans want to know who it is they are dealing with; to learn about their
origins, views, values, wishes, preferences, habits; and as they become more acquainted,
they typically want to know and understand more and more about their respective inter-
locutors. Such information may, after all, be of practical relevance to them in realizing
their intentions, for instance, in determining the trustworthiness of an interlocutor.
Machines, on the other hand, have neither biography nor identity. Yet if they are to
pass the Turing test, they must present themselves to their interlocutors as human, and
for this purpose fake biographies and identities must be manufactured. As the history
of the clandestine services shows, cover stories are difficult to create, and living a cover
identity is hard to carry off successfully in a way that will withstand real scrutiny. The
sorts of pseudo-personae employed by covert operatives can often survive only superficial
examination, and will likely break down under intense questioning.
It is of course possible to store large bodies of factual knowledge in Turing machines,
including knowledge about a person’s biography and identity. A fundamental difference
between the machine and the human case, however, is that a human’s life history is
expressed not as the recital of a series of pieces of information but rather as realizations
of that integrated complex of evolving dispositions which is the person’s identity. These
dispositions exist because the human being has a certain neurophysiology which is at
any given stage the combined outcome of interactions between his genotype and his
experiences up to that stage.25
Recounting one’s biography is not merely generating a list of facts. It is a part of
realizing one’s identity, and is thus tied to ones aims and goals. And it is a capability
whose realization essentially involves inner mental experience. For example, when we are
asked to recall aspects of our past, remembered experiences immediately become part of
the context of our present experiences, where they are coloured by present feelings such
as pride, regret, sadness, shame. These feelings will shape the way we will answer the
interrogator’s questions about our past life, even if we try to hide our emotions. The
24By this we mean a human being without a mental disorder of the sort that would seriously impair the
display of personality.
25To avoid misunderstandings: We do not wish to imply that only something with our kind of DNA,
neurons, and so forth, could pass the Turing test. We think that any entity with real intentions and
the ability to undergo auto-modifications analogous to inherited changes of genotype could evolve
to master the Turing test given enough time and environmental pressure. This could even happen
within the lifetime of a single entity if it lived long enough to survive the modifications.
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interrogator acting as interpreter will consciously or unconsciously sense these emotions
and this will again shape the way he interprets our response.
Because machines lack an inner mental life – as we do not know how to engineer such a
thing – they also lack those capabilities, including capabilities relating to the emotional
life, used in language production which draw on the implicit level of interpretation. The
interrogator, because she is tuned to the expression of capabilities of these sorts, will
soon notice this absence.
Furthermore, the life history upon which the human can draw is complete; it has no
gaps. What this means is that, however hard we drill down to the details of a life, there
will always be a fact of the matter that is at least in principle able to be determined,
even though not all of these facts can be known directly by the subject in question (for
example because he does not remember them, or because they pertain to events which
took place at or before the time of his birth).
Every cover story, in contrast, like every work of fiction, is of necessity incomplete. It
has what Ingarden called loci of indeterminacy, by which he means gaps left unspeci-
fied.26 This will hold, too, of the cover stories assigned to the machine. It is impossible
to program a machine without such gaps, in the same way that it is impossible (and
in any case not desirable) to write a novel without them. The designer of a “learning
machine” would need to find a way to make it respond to challenges pertaining to such
loci by allowing it to fill in gaps when challenged. The results, however, would be in
some ways analogous to the confabulations produced by patients suffering from dementia
who do exactly this – often displaying considerable creativity – in order to conceal their
memory gaps.
If, as under the conditions of the strong Turing test, the interrogator is allowed – is
indeed required – to dispense with the rather shallow sorts of question-answer sessions
typically discussed in the Turing test literature, he will thereby be able to force his
interrogees to bare their souls, to reveal exactly who they are, how they have realized, or
failed to realize, their goals in life. A normal linguistically articulate human interrogee
is easily able to pass this test. For the machine-that-is-pretending-to-be-a-human it will
take more, much more, than a convincing cover story coupled with algorithms for filling
gaps.
3.2 Static aspects of language production and interpretation
In providing an account of the powers that would be required of a machine purporting to
emulate human dialogue behaviour, we distinguish between static and dynamic aspects
of language production and interpretation.
An act of producing or interpreting a linguistic utterance is said to be static if it can
be performed without the need to take temporal context into account. It is said to be
dynamic if this is not the case – in other words if account needs to be taken of the
26Loci of indeterminacy are part of the stratum of represented objects in the structure of the literary
work. Because the entities in this stratum (for example the protagonists in a novel) are defined using
only a finite number of sentences, many aspects – relating to hair colour or weight or temperature or
mood – must be left undetermined. See Ingarden, op. cit.
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switching of roles over time. We will begin with the static aspects, and show that the
machine struggles even with these. We will then move on to the much more demanding
dynamic aspects.
3.2.1 Static production by humans and machines
Static production is only found in the first utterance of a dialogue (the dialogue-initiating
utterance); after this, dynamic utterance production takes place. In this situation, the
machine faces the problem of generating a first utterance. This problem is fundamental,
since it relates directly to the fact that the machine has no intentions and therefore
cannot perform human-like speech acts. An initiating speech act of this sort when made
by a human is always a reaction not just to some perceived external situation but also
to some inner mental experience which shapes the intentions that drive the human to
act. Such initiation is easy in those instances where there is a practical need – for
example to ask a question of a salesperson before buying, to alleviate acute boredom,
or to warn someone of an imminent danger. In many cases, however, human dialogue
initiation involves overcoming a series of hurdles,27 of which the fear of rejection is only
the most apparent. For this reason, humans take great care when initiating dialogue with
persons with whom they are unacquainted, drawing on resources of prudence, confidence,
bravado, and above all on an ability to anticipate the likely reactions to such an overture
on the part of a stranger. They are required, on the basis of physical appearance alone, in
what may be a very complex and rapidly changing situation involving what may be very
many non-verbal clues, to make decisions regarding a major source of human behavioural
failure. (Another such major source is failing correctly to interpret an overture from a
stranger.)
On one Turing test scenario the interrogator will simply remain silent until the in-
terrogee makes an opening conversational move. How is a machine to make the initial
utterance in such a scenario? This could, of course, involve appeal to some routine
formula such as: “Hi! My name is Hal. How do you do?” But it will be hard for a
machine to vary the dialogue start in a convincing way. This is because, unlike humans,
the machine has no intuitive understanding of the situation its interlocutor is in. It will
indeed have some of the same non-verbal clues as the human, such as facial expression
and body language. It can comment, for example, on the interrogator’s clothes. But it
needs to draw out from what it can see the beginnings of a coherent narrative in the
way that humans have been trained to do over the course of evolution.
3.2.2 Static interpretation by humans
What now as regards the interpretation of a single utterance of the sort we are called
upon to perform in relation to the first utterance in a dialogue. For humans, according to
current understanding, this task has two steps: first is a syntactic step, which is realized
27Different sorts of hurdles are faced by different sorts of people in different contexts. In polite social
circles in England, for example, a dialogue initiation step can be made only between persons who
have already been introduced. Men and women face different hurdles in almost all contexts.
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through a dynamic process of syntactical sentence parsing and construction using the
structural elements constituting the sentence.28
This syntactical analysis yields the basis for the second, semantic step, which is the
context-dependent assigning of meaning to the sentence (Loebner, 2013). Even for one
sentence this process has a dynamic aspect. This is because, beginning with the very
first word, the syntactic construction and semantic interpretation interact. This can
require several successive cycles of revision, as an initial syntactic construction is revised
as earlier parts of the sentence are re-interpreted in light of the ways they interact with
parts coming later.29
For a single utterance, the context required for its interpretation by a human is what
Barker (1968) refers to as the ecological setting. This is the salient part of the environ-
mental (physical) context in which the dialogue takes place and which will typically be
centred on the person by whom the utterance is made. The absence of such a context
explains why humans find it hard to speak on the phone with someone they have never
met or spoken to before. The absence of a shared physical environment severely reduces
the amount of context usable by the interlocutors and thereby creates a barrier to the
transmission of meaning.
When interpreting the single utterance, the human has to apply contexts available to
her from her own biography together with any clues she can draw from her interlocutor’s
physical appearance and behaviour. Discourse economy forces her to make assumptions
on this basis in her attempt to understand those aspects of meaning left implicit by
a speaker, for example in order to disambiguate ambiguous aspects of his utterance,
or gauge the force of turns of phrase that might in some contexts be threatening. In
real conversations, humans use a massive amount of contextual non-verbal utterance-
structure to achieve this. For example, when negotiating the purchase of a used car, the
buyer will look for non-verbal cues indicating the reliability and honesty of the seller to
make up for the information asymmetry inherent to the situation (Akerlof, 1970).
In addition, humans interpret static utterances by using knowledge they have de-
rived through processing their own experiences over time, above all knowledge acquired
through practical experience of the way the world around them is structured causally.
From these experiences (combined with innate capabilities) they acquire an ability to
reason about the relationships which link together entities in our environment into dif-
ferent families of predictable patterns.30 The latter are then extended also to the entities
referred to in dialogue utterances, and this enables these utterances to be interpreted,
for example in terms of their practical relevance to the interpreter.
3.2.2.1 Human interpretation of multi-sentence static utterances Single utterances
consisting of more than one sentence are still more challenging for humans to interpret
than single-sentence utterances. This is because the sentences now contextualise each
28There are several grammatical theories about how this happens, ranging from generative to constraint-
based theories. Mu¨ller (2016) gives an overview.
29Auer (2009) has coined the term “on-line syntax” to describe this phenomenon.
30This ability is sometimes called ‘common sense’ (Smith, 1995). Compare also section 2.2 of (Landgrebe
and Smith, 2019).
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other: there are syntactic and semantic as well as explicit and implicit interdependencies
which link them together. For example, sentences may be connected explicitly, via
anaphora, or as chains of steps in an argument or chronological narrative, or implicitly,
through analogies or historical resonances attached to certain words or phrases.
3.2.3 Static interpretation by machines
How, then, does the machine interpret the single sentence utterance? Here again two
steps are involved: of syntactic construction and semantic interpretation. We deal with
these in turn.
The syntactic construction using structural elements that humans perform according
to the grammatical theories referred to in section 3.2.2 can be mimicked by the machine
quite effectively for written text, when no non-lexematic structural language material has
to be taken into account.31 Machines fail, however, as soon as non-lexematic structural
material such as facial expression, gestures, posture, or sound structures (2.5.5) come into
play. This is because the world knowledge enabling the interpretation of this material
– which can be combined in arbitrary forms to create many different sorts of contexts
– cannot be learned without life experience and it cannot be mathematically formalised
(compare paragraph 3.2.5).
For the interpretation of a single sentence – abstracting for now from non-lexematic
material – the machine needs to reproduce the syntactic construction achieved by hu-
mans if the static interpretation pattern used by the human brain (syntactical analysis
followed by semantic step) is to be reproduced32. This requires use of computational
phrase structure grammar, dependency grammar or compositional grammar parsers.33
All of these create trees which represent the syntactic structure of the sentence. The
parsers work well if the input sentences are syntactically valid. However, if a sentence is
syntactically valid but semantically ambiguous, as in:
(4) He saw old men and women,
an ideal computational parser will create two syntactic trees representing each sense.34
It is with the interpretation of the syntactic structure – in other words with the move
from syntax to semantics – that machines struggle, and this holds even in the static
single sentence utterance case. For what is the context which the machine could use to
assign meaning to a single sentence? The machine cannot decide this on its own. The
multitude of combinations of language elements (compare section 2.2) allow for a huge
number of interpretation possibilities even at the single sentence level. The machine
31By ‘lexematic material’, here, we mean those structural elements that can be directly reduced to
lexemes – essentially wordforms and all their variants and composites.
32The mainstream machine-learning-NLP community thinks this is no longer necessary. All is supposed
to be computed implicitly using “end-to-end deep neural networks”.
33An overview is given in Manning and Schu¨tze (1999).
34This feature is only available with compositional grammar parsers (Moortgat, 1997). With a suffi-
ciently sophisticated computational setup, a context-dependent disambiguation may be possible.
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cannot decide, for instance, how to fill in implicit meaning generated by the frequent
usage of language economics, incomplete utterances or ellipses.
To achieve this the machine would need an appropriate context and dialogue horizon.
Background information would thus need once more to be given to the machine, analo-
gous to the cover story background information needed to enable mimicry of a human
dialogue-partner. If the scope of the anticipated subsequent sentences is very narrow,
one can create a library of contexts and use a classifier to determine an appropriate
context choice for a given input sentence. This context can be loaded and used to assign
a meaning to the sentence with the help of logical inference. To achieve this, the logical
language to be used needs to have the properties of completeness and compactness (Boo-
los et al., 2007). This means, however, that the expressiveness of both the sentence to be
interpreted and the specification of contexts must be severely restricted, thus marking
one more dimension along which the machine will fall short of general AI.
What can be achieved in this fashion is illustrated in the field of customer correspon-
dence management, where there are repetitive customer concerns that can be classified
and for which pre-fabricated narrow background contexts can be stored in the machine
using first-order logic. Customer texts can then be understood by relating them to this
knowledge base.35 However, it can be applied only in those special sorts of situation
where the relevant contexts can be foreseen and documented in advance.
In both the weak and the strong versions of the Turing test, however, the range of
contexts and context combinations is as vast as the human imagination. The human
interlocutor can speak about anything he has experienced, read about or can imagine,
depending on his biography, his current mood and intentions and their interaction with
the situation he is in. It is impossible to build a library of contexts that would prepare a
Turing machine for this kind of variation. In nearly all situations, therefore, the machine
will not have any context to load in order to assign a meaning to the sentence, let alone
to disambiguate personal pronoun anaphora of the sort illustrated in a sentence such as:
(5) Been in touch with the Holy Spirit, or with the Pope, lately? How has he been?
3.2.4 Machine interpretation of suprasentential utterances
The space of possible contexts is all the more immense when we consider multi-sentence
(suprasentential) utterances. Here interpretation requires the ability to identify and
interpret complicated relationships between sentences, including all the syntactic and
semantic as well as explicit and implicit sentence interdependencies of the sorts listed
identified in 3.2.2.1. In open text-understanding tasks36 it is impossible to foresee the
possible sentence relationships and to provide in advance knowledge of the sort that
would enable the machine to interpret them adequately.
Consider, to take a toy example, the tasks the machine would face in interpreting the
following sentences:
35This is the approach described in section 3.2 of Landgrebe and Smith (2019).
36Closed tasks are those in which a large proportion of the texts to be understood contain repetitive
patterns, such as customer or creditor correspondence or notices of tax assessment.
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(6) The salmon caught the smelt because it was quick.
(7) But the otter caught it because it was slow.
First, to understand that the explicit anaphora ‘it’ refers to ‘salmon’ in both (6)
and (7) – even though two contradictory properties (‘slow’ and ‘quick’) are attributed
to it – and thus to understand the reason for the adversative ‘but’ in (7), the machine
needs biological knowledge about the species involved and about their respective hunting
behaviours37. Given such knowledge it can contextualise the two adjectives by tying them
to different parts of the total situation described in the sentence pair. Already this is
difficult – but infinitely many such combinations with much higher difficulty are possible
(for instance, consider this very text which you, the reader, now have before you).
3.2.5 Machine interpretation of static non-lexematic material
In the strong Turing test, the machine has to interpret the entire structural material
of an utterance, including the non-lexematic parts, which means: facial expressions,
gestures, body language, as well as sound structures emanating from the interrogator.
All of these can transform the interpretation of the lexematic structure: a sardonic grin,
for example, when associated with what would otherwise be a compassionate utterance,
can transform it into something sadistic; body language, pace, or intonation can make
an expression of interest or a compliment sound hollow or sarcastic.
We will see that it is impossible for machines to detect such clues and to combine them
with lexematic material in a way that would make it possible for them to achieve the sort
of adequate interpretation that would be required to pass the strong Turing test – for the
reason that the variance resulting from such combinations is huge, and each combination
is a rare event which cannot be learned from training material. Furthermore, each
combination of structural utterance material allows different interpretations. To make
a selection from them and to create a reply based thereon that seems natural (non-
stereotypical) to a human interlocutor requires an array of capabilities and intentions
(an identity) which the machine lacks.
4 Modelling dialogue dynamics mathematically
In the previous section we have seen that it is very hard to make machines utter and
interpret single static utterances. What happens in a real dialogue? As described in
section 2.6, the evolution of a dialogue can be highly dynamic. The interlocutors switch
roles as utterers and interpreters as they take turns based on signals in ordered or
unordered form (cutting each other short, interrupting, speaking at the same time).
While this happens, their respective dialogue horizons are in constant movement, and
so are the intentions and speech acts based thereon. New utterances interact with older
ones, the dialogue creates its own context.
37The interpretation of the second ‘it’ as referring to the smelt is perhaps still possible. Ambiguity is
often simply not fully resolvable
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From a mathematical perspective, a dialogue is a temporal process in which each pro-
duced utterance is drawn from an extremely high dimensional, multivariate distribu-
tion.38 Each produced utterance can relate to the utterances that preceded it in an
erratic manner. In other words: there is no way to formalise the relationship between
the utterance and what preceded it.39 Each utterance interpretation is drawn from a
distribution of similar complexity, and can relate also to the utterance that preceded it
in an erratic manner.
To see the sorts of problems that can arise, consider a dialogue between Mary and
Jack involving several rounds of role-switching. Mary makes an utterance at round 7,
which requires Jack to take into account an utterance from round 3. Based on this, Jack
associates with Mary’s utterance an experience from his own past, of which Mary knew
nothing, and provides an answer relating to this experience. This utterance from Jack
is for Mary quite unexcepted (erratic) given her utterance in round 7. But it is perfectly
coherent from the perspective of Jack, given his inner experience. Given phenomena
such as this, there is no way to formalize the relationship between an interpretation of
an utterance and this utterance itself.
4.1 Modelling dialogues as temporal processes
To understand the dialogue as a temporal process, four types of events need to be
distinguished:
1. (static) initial utterance production, followed by
2. (static) initial utterance interpretation, followed by
3. (dynamic) dialogue-dependent responding utterance production, followed by
4. (dynamic) dialogue-dependent utterance interpretation.
These are linked via relations of dependence. In the prototypical case, pairs of events of
types 3. and 4. are repeated until the dialogue concludes.
The distribution from which each of these events is drawn varies massively with the
passage of time, as ever new utterances are generated and interpreted.
Both utterer and interpreter have a huge number of choices to make when generating
and interpreting meaning, and because these choices depend on the various dialogue
contexts (including the dialogue itself) and on their respective horizons, as well as on
the biographies, personalities, capabilities, intentions, (and so forth), of the participants
themselves. Each utterance and each interpretation is therefore erratic, which means:
it cannot be modelled as depending on the set of observations made before utterance or
interpretation choice is made.
38A multivariate distribution is a distribution that can be modelled using the vector spaces employed
in stochastics. (Klenke, 2013)
39Falling in love at first sight is a classic example of an event relating in an erratic manner to the events
that precede it.
29
To make matters worse, this does not even take into account the fact that most human
dialogues deviate from the turn-taking prototype. For example, it is not conceivable
that we could create a mathematical model that would enable the computation of the
appropriate interpretation of interrupted statements, or of statements made by people
who are talking over each other, or of the appropriate length of a pause in a conversation,
which may depend on context (remembrance dinner or cocktail party), on emotional
loading of the situation, on knowledge of the other person’s social standing or dialogue
history, or on what the other person is doing – perhaps looking at his phone – when
the conversation pauses. Pauses are context modifiers which influence or are important
ingredients of the overall dialogue interpretation. They often contain subtle non-verbal
cues, for example the fiddling of the interlocutor with a small object indicating irritation
or nervousness.
4.2 Mathematical models of temporal processes
Two types of explicit mathematical methods are available to model temporal processes:
differential equations and stochastic process models. Given that there are no other meth-
ods available,40 any Turing machine able to model such processes would have to draw
from these alternatives or from some combination.
4.2.1 Differential equation models
Such models can be used to provide adequate representations of the changes in related
variables when their relationships follow deterministic patterns of the sort that can be
observed in the physical realm (for example radioactive decay over time). By “adequate
model”, we mean a scientific model that is able (in ascending order of scientific utility) to
1. describe, 2. explain or 3. predict phenomena and their relationships. Description is
the minimum requirement for any scientific model, but often the other two properties are
also needed to make the model useful. Differential equations can be used, for example,
to make predications regarding changes such as are involved in the distribution of heat
from a source in space, which is modelled using the heat equation, a partial differential
equation first developed by Fourier in 1822. But such models can only deal with a small
number of variables and their interrelations. Whether the equations are adequate models
of reality needs to be (and always can be) verified or falsified using physical experiments.
To pass the Turing test, adequate utterances have to be produced by the machine.
Mathematically speaking, an utterance produced by the machine – no matter what
algorithm is used – is a model-based prediction conditioned on the previous utterances
in the dialogue and on the context (just as a Go-playing machine predicts its own next
move conditioned on the opponent’s last move and the overall situation on the board).
Such predictions need to be highly accurate41 and their quality has to be maintained
40That is, nothing else exists in the body of knowledge of mathematics and theoretical physics.
41Accuracy of stochastic models is measured by the percentage of predictions that match human expec-
tations. In this case, this would mean a high degree of utterance salience.
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over the entire course of the dialogue, otherwise the human interrogator will realise that
his interlocutor is non-human and the machine will fail the test.
It is a problem therefore, that as concerns social processes – and biological phenomena
in general – differential equations cannot even provide descriptions, much less explana-
tions or predictions, of the changes involved. This follows already from the fact that the
number of variables involved in such phenomena is too large and their interdependences
too complex to make such modeling possible. Evidence that proposed models do not
work in these sorts of contexts is provided by the fact that they are falsified by empiri-
cal observations over and over again. Where differential equations are used successfully
in biology this is because the number of variables is limited, for example in modelling
organism population growth under simplified laboratory conditions.
The application of differential equation-based models to the problem of dialogue pro-
duction and interpretation is for the same reason impossible. There are far too many
variables, and we cannot even begin to formulate equations that would describe their
relationships. The reason for this is that, although all the parts of the brain function in
accordance with the laws of nature, the system behaviour is deterministic-chaotic for the
phenomenon of language production42 and thus cannot be modelled using differential
equations (Schuster and Just, 2005). We cannot even describe it in these terms, much
less form predictions.
4.2.2 Stochastic process models
These can describe the behaviour of a one- or multi-dimensional random stochastic
process X, but only if
1. the random event, and thus the associated random variable (in what follows: r.v.)
Xt, has a distribution over time belonging to the exponential family,
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2. the process has additional properties that allow mathematical modelling (specif-
ically, it must have independent and stationary increments, as further specified
below).
The most expressive family of stochastic models, and thus the models that have had
the widest usage in describing phenomena based on human interactions, is the Wiener
process model (also referred to under the heading “Brownian motion”), which belongs
to a family of models used extensively (indeed, too extensively, as we shall see) to model
financial market processes such as movements in stock or derivative prices (Jeamblanc
et al., 2009). Such prices are an expression of the aggregated intentions of very many
market participants. The models make strong mathematical assumptions, for example
42A deterministic-chaotic system obeys deterministic laws but cannot be modelled due to overcomplexity.
An erratic event, on the other hand, is an event – such as a sudden movement of the oil price – which
seems unrelated to the events that precede it, and for which we have neither explanation nor model.
In a Laplacian view of the universe, an erratic event is just an instance of a deterministic-chaotic
process step.
43Often this is the Gaussian distribution, i.e. Xt ∼ N (µ, σ
2) .
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that a price change process X is a case of Brownian motion, or in other words that it
satisfies the following conditions:
1. it has independent r.v. increments: for any pair of time points
(s, t), Xt+s −Xs ⊥⊥ F
X
s , where F
X
s models the time before t,
2. it is stationary: ∀s > 0 : (Xt+s) = (Xt), t ≥ 0, and
3. for any time point t > 0, Xt ∼ N (0, t).
Condition 1. expresses the fact that each increment of the r.v. is independent of what
happened in the past; condition 2. that the unconditional44 joint probability distribution
of the process does not change when shifted in time; condition 3. expresses that the r.v.
is distributed according to the Gaussian distribution.
Unfortunately, processes satisfying these conditions are nowhere to be found in actual
markets. This is, again, because the preferences and intentions of human beings are
erratic (in part because they depend on real world events, for example geopolitical events,
which are also erratic). This is why, whenever collective decisions are off-trend, financial
stochastic process models fail (McCauley, 2009).
Dialogues, too, as we have seen, are multivariate processes, with the r.v. – utter-
ances and interpretations – drawn from immense, typically unknown, and in any case
not modellable multivariate distributions. Neither utterances nor interpretations are dis-
tributed according to a multivariate Gaussian distribution, since they are non-stationary
and non-independent. And, to make matters even worse, interpretations are not directly
observable (see paragraph 2.4).
The Brownian motion model is therefore not applicable, as none of its three conditions
is satisfied.
4.2.3 Stochastic differential equation models
Differential equations can be extended to model temporal processes subjected to stochas-
tic effects (noise), for example to model molecular dynamics. Again, however, even
stochastically modified differential equations would still not be applicable to the prob-
lem of dialogue process modelling, since this would require that the assumptions needed
for the applicability of both differential equations and stochastic process models would
hold simultaneously for processes of language use. In fact however both of these sets of
assumptions fail.
4.2.4 Deep Neural Network (dNN) models
These are a subclass of stochastic models that have in recent years been associated with
considerable enthusiasm, triggered above all by:
1. the successes achieved since 2014 in improving automated translation through use
of dNNs,
44This means: involving no reference to any particular starting value.
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2. the popularisation by Goodfellow et al. (2014) of generative adversarial networks
(GANs),45 and
3. the invention of reinforcement learning, which brought the capability to outperform
human beings, for example in the game of Go (Silver et al., 2016).
dNNs were accordingly tested early on in the domain of process modelling. We review
the potential capability of three seemingly promising dNN-methods to model human
dialogues, before looking at the empirical evidence yielded by experiments in dialogue
emulation.
4.2.5 Deep recurrent neural network (rNN) models
These are dNN which contain connections between the nodes of the dNN graph in a
way that allows the modelling of temporal sequences. They are often called sequence-
to-sequence-dNNs because they can be used to create one sequence from another (for
example, a translation from an input sentence). Often long-term-short-term-memory
(LSTM) (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997) and its numerous extensions are used in
practice. Because classical stochastic process models are not able to model multivariate
processes, the ability of rNNs to model temporal processes has been investigated in
recent years as a potential saving alternative (Dasgupta and Osogami, 2017; Neil et
al., 2016; Lai et al., 2017). The results have performed well in modelling certain sorts
of processes, for example road traffic occupancy, solar power production, or electricity
consumption over time (Lai et al., 2017). As the latter reports, they have outperformed
classical stochastic process modelling in certain tasks, especially when two processes with
different patterns are overlaid in a series of observations.
We can infer from these examples several reasons why rNNs work well on such numer-
ical time-series data:
1. data of these sorts approximately fulfil the assumptions needed for stochastic pro-
cess modelling in general (of which dNNs, and thus rNNs, are a special case),
2. the data are repetitive and huge historical datasets are available for training pur-
poses,
3. the dimensionality and the variance of the data is low,46
4. dNN architectures can be used to model temporal pattern overlays of the sort
observed for example in traffic occupancy, which has a circadian and a workday
vs. weekend rhythm.
Unfortunately, human dialogues
45Invented by Schmidhuber in (Schmidhuber, 1990).
46Exchange rates, another example modelled using dNNs, form a special case. This is because outcome
dimensionality and variance are here relatively low in the short term, but mid-term outcomes are
erratic. Thus the models work less successfully (Lai et al., 2017).
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i are not repetitive, but erratic.
ii do not fulfil the central assumptions presupposed by temporal process models.
iii are of extremely high dimensionality, and
iv manifest variance that is as large as the sum of the results of all human activities
since the emergence of our species.
Moreover, because the interpretations involved at each stage of the dialogue are im-
plicit (see 2.4), we can never use them as a source of training data. This will mean that
there can never be training data to cover the dependencies that hold between successive
utterances occurring over time, since interpretations are an essential link in the chain
between one utterance and the next.
Note again, however, that all of this holds only for dialogues in general, the mastery
of which is a criterion of general AI. As we shall see, for very stereotypical dialogues, for
example the telephone scheduling of a haircut or the reservation of a hotel room, there
could eventually be sufficient training data for a dNN-based approach to be of value.
4.2.5.1 Generative adversarial network (GAN) models work using two networks, one
discriminative, the other generative (Goodfellow et al., 2014). The former is trained
to discriminate classes of input data using annotated training material, often pictures
tagged by human beings (for example pictures in which humans can be distinguished
from other items represented). The generative network is then tasked to create new
samples of one desired class (for example pictures of humans, (Karras et al., 2018),
which it can indeed do). The two networks are then chained together by having the
samples yielded by the generative network passed on to the discriminative network for
classification. The system is then optimised to minimise the rate at which samples
are generated that are not classified by the discriminative network as belonging to the
desired class. This approach works very well with pictures, because the discriminative
net can be pretrained with adequate training material (data tagged by humans).
Again, however, GANs are not applicable to language. For to build an utterance-
generating GAN that creates meaningful output one would need to pretrain a discrimi-
native net that can distinguish meaningful from non-meaningful utterances. The prob-
lem is that, because the meaningfulness of an utterance depends on its context and
interpretation, there is no conceivable way in which a sufficient body of training mate-
rial could be assembled to cover the practically infinite variance of human utterances.
It is therefore not possible to create a discriminative net that can be used to build a
meaningful-utterance-producing GAN.
4.2.6 Models based on reinforcement learning
In reinforcement learning, a reward (score) is assigned when a certain step in a repeatable
type of finite process is realized by the machine. ‘Finite’, here means that the process
ends after a series of steps that is not too long, such as a game of Go or a first-person
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shooter game in which killing sequences are repeated. In Go, for example, a trained
algorithm is used to assign a score after each action the machine performs in each game.
The machine obtains one point for each stone of the opponent it captures and one point
for each grid intersection of territory it occupies. The trained algorithm is optimised
to maximise the total score obtained over the entire game. This is done by having the
computer play the game billions of times in different situations, so that optimal paths
for these situations can be found and stored in the model.
Crucial, for such optimization to be possible, is that the scores for every move can
be assigned automatically by the machine. Machine learning of this sort can thus be
used only in those situations in which the results of machine decisions can be scored via
further machine decisions. This is primarily in games, but the method can be extended,
for example, to debris cleaning scenarios where what is scored is the number of units
of debris removed. In such narrowly defined situations, machines can find behavioural
strategies that outperform human behaviour (Jaderberg and Czarnecki, 2018). Lastly,
reverse reinforcement learning (Arora and Doshi, 2018), a technique to automatically
learn an adequate reward score from observed situations, does not help in the dialogue
case because there is here no adequate set of observed situations because – with very few
exceptions – almost all dialogues are different, too few patterns are repeated sufficiently
many times.
Reinforcement learning cannot, therefore, be applied to the engineering of Turing-
test-capable dialogue systems, for there is here nothing to which the needed sorts of
scores can be assigned. (There is no winning, as we might say; or at least no winning
of the sort that can be generally, and repeatedly, and consistently, and automatically
scored.) We note also that the truly impressive successes of reinforcement learning do
not provide evidence that general AI is about to be achieved. This is because the scope
of applicability of such algorithms is narrowly limited to situations in which scoring is
possible. It is also because the meta-parameter for the algorithms which compute the
optimisation, the reinforcement including its scores (and many others) need to be set in
each case by engineers.
4.3 Current state-of-the-art in dialogue systems: A review of what has
been achieved thus far
Even given all of the above, dialogue emulation is an area of considerable activity in
AI circles. The resultant dialogue systems – also called ‘agents’ (or in some circles
‘chatbots’) – are designed and built to fulfil three tasks (citing Gao et al. (2018), p. 6):
1. Question Answering – “the agent needs to provide concise, direct answers to user
queries based on rich knowledge drawn from various data sources”
2. Task Completion – “the agent needs to accomplish user tasks ranging from restau-
rant reservation to meeting scheduling [. . . ] and business trip planning”
3. Social Chat – “the agent needs to converse seamlessly and appropriately with users
– it is performance along this dimension that defines the quality of being human
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as measured in the Turing Test – and provide useful recommendations”.
In our view at least, the third task could only be performed by a machine with general
AI. Indeed, it would be one of the purposes of general AI to perform tasks such as this.
The Turing test would then be one instrument for validating performance ability.
4.3.1 Question Answering and Task Completion
Question Answering and Task Completion are areas in which dialogue systems are al-
ready of considerable commercial value, mainly because customers with relatively homo-
geneous cultural backgrounds can be motivated to reduce their utterance variance – for
example by articulating clearly and using sentences from a pre-determined repertoire –
if by interacting with a bot they can quickly obtain answers to questions or resolution of
boring tasks. In the medium term, technologies of these sorts will enable systems which
can satisfy a double-digit percentage of customer requests.
However, Question Answering and Task Completion clearly have nothing to do with
passing the weak or the strong Turing test in a way that would be indicative of general
AI. Fulfilment of each is (thus far) something that is achieved simply by using appropri-
ately configured software tools, which every user identifies as such immediately on first
engagement.
4.3.2 Social Chat
What, then, about Social Chat (also called ‘neural chitchat’) applications? Here, re-
search is currently focused on two approaches:
• supervised learning with core technology end-to-end sequence-to-sequence deep
networks using LSTM (section 4.2.5) with several extensions and variations, in-
cluding use of GANs,47 and
• reinforcement learning used to train conversational choice-patterns over time (the
optimal path of machine utterances during a dialogue).48
Strong claims are made on behalf of such approaches, for example in Zhou et al.
(2018) which describes Microsoft’s XiaoIce system – “XiaoIce” is Chinese for “little
Bing” – which is said to be “the most popular social chatbot in the world”. XiaoIce was
“designed as an AI companion with an emotional connection to satisfy the human need
for communication, affection, and social belonging.” The paper claims that XiaoIce “dy-
namically recognizes human feelings and states, understands user intents, and responds
to user needs throughout long conversations.” Since its release in 2014, XiaoIce has,
we are told, “communicated with over 660 million users and succeeded in establishing
long-term relationships with many of them.”
47Discussed in 4.2.5.1 above, and in Gao, et al ., op. cit., pp. 53-56.
48Discussed in 4.2.6 above, and in loc. cit., pp. 59-61.
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Like other “neural” chitchat applications, however, XiaoIce displays two major flaws,
either of which will cause any interlocutor to realise immediately that they are not
dealing with a human being and which will prevent any sane user from “establishing a
long-term relationship” with the algorithm.
First, such applications create repetitive, generic, deflective and bland responses, such
as “I don’t know” or “I’m OK”. This is because the training corpora they are parame-
terised from contain many such answers, and so the likelihood that such an answer might
somehow fit is rated by the system as high. Several attempts have been made to improve
answer quality in this respect, but the utterances obtained from the algorithms are still
very poor. The reason is that the algorithms merely mimic existing input-utterance-to-
output-utterance sequences without interpreting the specific (context-dependent) input
utterance the system is reacting to.
Each input is treated, in fact, as if it were the input to a machine translation engine
of the sort which merely reproduces sentence pairs from existing training sets. The dif-
ference is that here the training sets consist of pairs of sentences succeeding each other
in one or other of the dialogues stored in a large dialogue corpus. The result is that,
with the exception of a small subset of the structural elements, none of the sources
of human discourse variance listed in section 2.2 are taken into account in generating
output utterances. Again, no attempt is made to interpret the texts. Rather, in pro-
ducing utterances, the machine simply tries to copy those utterances in the training
set which immediately follow syntactically and morphologically similar input symbol
sequences. This means that utterances are decoupled from context, and so responses
appear ungrounded. Attempts to improve matters on this front using what are called
“Grounded Conversation Models” (Gao et al., op. cit., section 5.3) – which try to in-
clude background- or context-specific knowledge – have not solved the problem. The
failure to model the utterance variance sources persists.
Second, these sorts of applications create ever more incoherent utterances over time.
This is first of all because they cannot keep track of the dialogue as its own context
2.3.3, and secondly because the datasets they are trained from are actually models of
inconsistency due to the fact that they are created as mere collections of fragments drawn
from large numbers of different dialogues. Attempts to alleviate the problem using
“speaker” embeddings or “persona”-based response-generation models have improved
the situation slightly (Ghazvininejad et al., 2017); but they do not come close to ensuring
consistent conversation.
To refer to the existing social chat algorithms as “neural” is, therefore, somewhat
far-fetched. The neural ability of simple species such as round worms (302 neurons) or
jellyfish (5000 neurons) is much higher, for the survival of the latter through some 500
million years of evolution suggests that they have the ability to integrate situational
stimuli from a range of contexts to yield adequate reactions.
Given that machines of the mentioned sorts can neither interpret utterances by taking
into account the sources of variance, nor produce utterances on the basis of such inter-
pretations together with associated (for example biographical) knowledge, the approach
cannot be seen as promising when it comes to mastering the Turing test in either its
weak or its strong versions.
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4.3.3 Reinforcement leaning in neural chitchat
The basic problem of reinforcement learning (RL) for social dialogue is that it is impos-
sible to define a meaningful reward. XiaoIce uses CPS (conversation turns per session,
(Zhou et al., 2018)), a measure that maximises the duration of a conversation. We doubt,
however, that the Turing test interrogator would be impressed by dialogue behaviour
generated to optimise a measure of this sort.
Li et al. (2016) used a more sophisticated reward system by training an RL-algorithm
using dNN-generated synthetic utterances (because using real human utterances would
be prohibitively expensive) together with a tripartite reward function rewarding
1. non-dull responses (using as benchmark a static list of dull phrases such as “I don’t
know”)
2. non-identical machine utterances, and
3. Markov-like short-term consistency.
The results are appalling, and one wonders why this type of research is being conducted,
given that – as a result of using synthetic data – it violates the basic principles of exper-
imental design as concerns adequacy of measurement setup for observation of interest.
4.3.4 Multi-purpose dNN language models
Recently, Radford et al. (2018) multitask dNN-language models from large corpora by
formulating the learning task as the ability to predict a language symbol – for example a
single word – based on the symbols preceding it, were trained using an unsupervised ap-
proach, but with the possibility to condition the model on certain task types (McCann
et al., 2017).49 The model that results (dubbed “GTP-2”) is then conditioned with
problem-specific input data to produce model-based predictions to solve NLP bench-
marks (“zero shot predictions”). For some basic tasks amenable to sequence-modelling
(including translation and text gap filling) the performance is good. For question an-
swering, however, which is the only dialogue-related task that was tested, only 4.1%
of questions50 were answered correctly. The limited relevance of the authors’ approach
to language modelling, which views language purely as a matter of sequences, becomes
apparent for example when they state that “While dialogue is an attractive approach,
we worry it is overly restrictive.”
4.4 Problem-specific AI: Turing machines enriched by prior knowledge
Looking at the main problem of social chatbots, namely their inability to interpret utter-
ances and to react to them with context-adequate, biography- and knowledge-grounded
49In the type of unsupervised learning described there, the algorithm learns models of probability dis-
tributions for symbol sequences from unlabelled input data. These models reflect symbol sequence
distributions. Once created, they can be used to predict symbol sequences given conditioned input.
50Typical example: “Largest state in the US by land mass?”
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responses, one could indeed imagine endowing an algorithm with systematic prior knowl-
edge of the sort required for conversations. The system presented in Landgrebe and
Smith (2019) incorporates prior knowledge in this way, focusing on knowledge of the
sort needed to complete tasks such as simple letter and email answering or repair bill
validation. It uses this prior knowledge and logical inference in combination with ma-
chine learning to explicitly interpret texts on the basis of their business context and to
create adequate interpretation-based responses. However, it works only because it has
strong, in-built restrictions.
• The range of linguistic inputs it has to deal with is very narrow (for example car
glass damage repair bills or customer change of address requests), thereby avoiding
the problem of complex and nested or self-referential contexts (section 2.3).
• It is not a conversation system and does not have to model a stochastic process,
because it reacts always to just one language input, thereby avoiding the prob-
lem of temporal dynamics (see section 2.6) – a problem that is not amenable to
mathematical modelling (see section 4).
Such a system would fail in dialogues, and this would be so even if it was stuffed to
the gills with (for example) biographical knowledge of the dialogue participants. This
is because it could not cope with either the complex dialogue contexts or the dialogue
dynamics. These phenomena aggravate the difficulties in dealing with language economy,
dialogue structure and modality, because the contexts and the dynamics create a huge
range of interpretation possibilities on all such levels. The resultant huge variance makes
it impossible to provide the machine with sufficient knowledge to derive meaningful
responses.
5 Conclusions
How, then, do humans pass the Turing test? By using language, as humans do. Language
is a unique human ability that evolved over millions of years of evolutionary selection
pressure.51 Using language gives us the ability to realize our intentions, for instance
by generating initial utterances (engaging in dialogue as a means of expressing ideas or
desires) and by dynamically interpreting an interlocutor’s utterances. This then allows
us to react adequately, either with further utterances or with corresponding actions.
Subconsciously or consciously, a human interlocutor is thereby able to sense the pur-
poses of a fellow human being with whom he interacts because this is a survival-critical
51“For Wittgenstein, the main reason why primarily human beings have the ‘privilege’ of ‘having’ men-
tal states is that ‘thinking’, ‘understanding’, ‘feeling pain’ and other psychological phenomena are
inseparably tied to human life and can only be grasped against this background . . . the ascription
of psychological states is necessarily connected with the human form of life; already as children we
learn to see some events as signs for human behavior as well as some specific behavior as sign for
‘inner’ states like ‘thinking’ or ‘being in pain.” (Neumaier (1986) pp. 151f.)
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ability. Machines cannot use language in this sense because they lack any framework of
intentions52 that could shape the way in which they interpret or generate utterances.
Ultimately, a human always notices that a machine has no intentions. An analo-
gous lack of intentions and purpose can be experienced also when speaking to long-term
schizophrenics with a consequent autistic syndrome. Their reaction patterns are imme-
diately perceived as non-normal, because the ability to interpret and create utterances
has deteriorated (Bleuler, 1983). Machines perform much worse than do such patients.
The AI community has so far failed to come to grips with the huge landscape of
variance in dialogue utterances and with the deterministic-chaotic nature of dialogues as
erratic stochastic processes. Could they take these factors into account with new system
designs? We have argued that there is no way to model the human use of language –
either explicitly as with classical approaches (summarised for example in (Russell and
Norvig (2014), section 22.4.1), or implicitly with deep neural networks or reinforcement
learning. And again, this is for mathematical reasons: there is no known type of model
which could even come close to representing human dialogue behaviour. This would still
be so even if we could make available the huge quantities of data – orders of magnitude
greater than the datasets used to train Google translate, one of the world’s largest
contemporary language-dNN – that such a model would need if a machine was to be
trained to implement it.
Turing machines can only compute what can be modelled mathematically, and since we
cannot model human dialogues mathematically, it follows that Turing machines cannot
pass the Turing test. This is so in both the weak form introduced by Turing and in the
strong form introduced in this paper.
Passing the strong form of the test would indeed be clear evidence of general Artificial
Intelligence. But this will not happen in the short- or mid-term. For our ability to
interpret and generate utterances that seem natural to a human interlocutor depends
on our identity, including the intentions we form. Intentions are the ultimate source of
dialogue variance, and we do not know how to teach a machine to emulate them.
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